

## Summary of COP26 Outcomes

The below is based largely on [Third World Network updates](#) with some additional information taken from [Carbon Brief's overview of key outcomes](#). For further coverage check [IISD Earth Negotiations Bulletin summary](#).

### COP, CMP and CMA cover decisions

The Presidency had no formal mandate to push through this decision which represents a departure from previous cover decisions both in length and content.

Decision “recognizes that limiting global warming to 1.5 °C requires rapid, deep and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions, including reducing global carbon dioxide emissions by 45 per cent by 2030 relative to the 2010 level and to **net zero around mid-century**, as well as deep reductions in other greenhouse gases”

Also “recognizes that this requires accelerated action in this critical decade, on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge and equity, reflecting CBDR-RC in the light of different national circumstances and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.”

Establishes a **work programme to urgently scale up mitigation** ambition and implementation - potentially duplicating the work of the Global Stock Take. In the end the decision was for the SBI to recommend a draft decision on this matter for adoption at CMA 4 “in a manner that complements the GST.”

Requests Parties to “align their targets in their NDCs with the PA temperature goal by the end of 2022, taking into account different national circumstances and requests the Secretariat to annually update the NDC synthesis report.

Decides to convene an “**annual high-level ministerial round table on pre-2030 ambition**.”

Urges Parties to communicate, by CMA 4, “long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies... towards just transitions to net zero emissions by or around mid-century, taking into account different national circumstances”

Calls upon Parties to “accelerate the development, deployment and dissemination of technologies, and the adoption of policies, to transition towards low-emission energy systems, including by rapidly scaling up the deployment of clean power generation and energy efficiency measures, including accelerating efforts towards the **phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies**, while providing targeted support to the poorest and most vulnerable in line with national circumstances and recognizing the need for support towards a just transition.” This prompted a media frenzy blaming India (and sometimes China) for “watering down” text, rebutted by many climate justice advocates: [here](#), and [here](#).

Urges developed countries “to **at least double their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation** to developing country Parties from 2019 levels by 2025.”

Welcomes the “first report on the determination of needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the PA.”

Decides that the **Santiago network on loss and damage will be provided with funds to support “technical assistance” and establishes the Glasgow Dialogue** “to discuss the arrangements for the funding of activities to avert, minimize and address loss and damage associated with the adverse impacts of climate change” which will take place in the June SBs from 2022-2024, organised “in cooperation” with the ExCom of the WIM

## **Adaptation**

Launches a comprehensive **two-year Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA)** jointly between the SBSTA and the SBI.

Objectives of the work programme are to: Enable implementation of PA towards achieving the GGA, with a view to enhancing adaptation action and support; Enhance understanding of the GGA, including of the methodologies, indicators, data and metrics, needs and support needed; Contribute to reviewing the overall progress towards GGA; Enhance national planning and implementation of adaptation actions through NAPs, NDCs and adaptation communications; Enable Parties to better communicate their adaptation priorities, implementation and support needs; Facilitate the establishment of robust, nationally appropriate systems for monitoring and evaluating adaptation; Enhance understanding of how communication and reporting instruments established under the Convention and the PA related to adaptation can complement each other in order to avoid duplication.

The work programme should build on the work of the Adaptation Committee related to the GGA, take into account traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous peoples and local knowledge systems, and be gender-responsive.

There will be 4 workshops per year, including two virtual intersessional workshops, with the SB chairs choosing the themes based on submissions from Parties, and will produce an annual report to the CMA.

## **Loss and damage**

This was a major fight for developing countries waged on two fronts: (i) the creation of a new financing facility for loss and damage and (ii) the financing for the functioning of the Santiago Network. Scene was set in the opening days as Antigua and Barbuda told the HL Segment: “should no formal mechanism for loss and damage compensation be established, member countries of the UN may be prepared to seek justice in the appropriate justice bodies.”

**The story:** G77 proposed a draft decision in week 1 containing paragraphs that would recognize: (i) “the need to ensure that the **Santiago Network’s** institutional coordination arrangements are **appropriately financed...**”; and (ii) “**the need for a financing stream on loss and damage...**” The resulting draft paragraph proposed by the co-facilitators, in G77 eyes, “did not contain any operational aspects nor how loss and damage finance can be scaled up and accessed.” Meanwhile, developed countries stated that loss and damage finance could not be discussed under the loss and damage agenda item but should be discussed under climate finance, while saying in climate finance talks that loss and damage finance should not be discussed at the technical level but rather should be considered at the political ministerial level during the second week. G77 sought to advance loss and damage finance under other agenda items such as long-term finance and the new collective quantified goal on climate finance while developed countries insisted that loss and damage finance should be limited only to providing finance for the operationalization of the SN and that the broader issue of loss and damage financing is not a topic for discussion at COP26.

At the final ministerial consultations, G77 tabled a textual proposal to “establish the Glasgow Loss and Damage Facility under the Financial Mechanism ..., and to provide new financial support [for loss and damage] under Article 9 of the PA, in addition to adaptation and mitigation finance. The ministerial consultations ended with no agreement. G77 then informally circulated a proposed text that: “Decides to launch a process to develop a facility, fund or other financial arrangements for providing financial support for loss and damage, through a subsidiary body, hereby established under the Convention, known as the Glasgow Ad-Hoc Working Group on Loss and Damage Finance” and “Further decides that the Glasgow Ad-Hoc Working Group on Loss and Damage Finance shall begin its work as a matter of urgency in xx 2022 by calling for submissions, holding meetings, workshops and multi-stakeholder dialogues, with input from the WIM Executive Committee and other experts, and shall produce a report with recommendations on the operationalization of a facility, fund or other financial arrangements, to be considered and adopted at COP27.” G77 then organised informal meetings with developed countries, who opposed the proposal. G77 then asked the Presidency to include the text in brackets to be discussed and decided in the final plenary, which the Presidency refused.

**The result:** CMA draft decision provides a mandate for the funding of the SN, and decides to “establish the Glasgow Dialogue on Loss and Damage.” The **G77 did not block this but stated that it understands that the dialogue referred to has as its end goal the establishment of the LD finance facility.**

**Decides the functions of the Santiago network** to be: Catalysing technical assistance of organizations, bodies, networks and experts to help WIM function; Catalysing demand-driven technical assistance for the implementation of relevant approaches to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage; Identifying, prioritizing and communicating technical assistance needs and priorities; Facilitating the consideration of a wide range of topics relevant to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage approaches; Facilitating and catalysing collaboration, coordination, coherence and synergies between L&D actors; Facilitating the development, provision, dissemination and access of/to L&D knowledge and info; Catalysing technical assistance under and outside the Convention and PA.

Requests the Secretariat to support developing countries...who want technical assistance from organizations, bodies, networks and experts under the Santiago network.

**Could not reach a decision on the governance of the WIM**, so “the considerations related to the governance of the WIM will continue” (in November 2022).

## Finance

Remained the most contentious set of issues across the agenda with all decisions bitterly contested and no solution in sight until the last day.

Major issues on **Long Term Finance (LTF)** included: **continuation of the LTF agenda under the COP; work on reviewing progress on the delivery of the \$100b goal; and language around the definition of climate finance.**

LTF agenda was extended until 2027 and a process set in motion to review the delivery of the \$100 billion goal. A mandate was given for the SCF to work on “climate finance definitions” taking into consideration submissions by Parties with a view to input to COP27. Developed countries blocked a decision to mandate the SCF to work toward a single multilaterally agreed climate finance definition.

Requests the SCF to “prepare a report in 2022 on progress towards achieving the goal of mobilizing jointly \$100 billion”

Invites the COP 27 Presidency (Egypt) to “organize the high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance in 2022 on the progress and fulfilment of the goal of mobilizing jointly \$100 billion per year by 2020”.

Decides “to convene **biennial high-level ministerial dialogues on climate finance in 2022, 2024 and 2026**” and requests the COP Presidency “to summarize the deliberations at the dialogues” at the subsequent COP.

“Notes with serious concern the gap in relation to the fulfilment” of the \$100b/year by 2020 goal, “including due to challenges in mobilizing finance from private sources”. Developed countries wanted to push the responsibility to developing countries and the lack of “enabling environments” in their countries due to which the private sector had not been able to mobilise finance, and had even gone as far as to suggest “welcoming” their efforts in meeting the goal of USD 100 billion.

Requests the SCF “to undertake further work on mapping the available information relevant to Article 2.1(c), of the PA”, on making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.

On the **New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG)**: developing countries were pushing for a concrete process to be established to arrive at the goal while developed countries wanted to discuss the goal via “workshops”.

Decides that “deliberations on the new collective quantified goal will be cyclical in nature, with the political deliberations providing guidance to the technical work to be conducted and the technical work informing the political deliberations”.

Establishes “an **ad hoc work programme from 2022 to 2024**” on the NCQG under the CMA and as part of this will hold 4 technical expert dialogues per year: one of which will be held during the June SBs, one during the COP/CMA, and the other two to be organized in separate regions. The co-chairs of the work programme will prepare an annual report.

Requests the Secretariat “to ensure the participation of all interested Parties, academia, civil society actors, including youth, and private sector actors, and that all meetings are open to observers and are webcast”.

Decides “to **convene high-level ministerial dialogues starting in 2022 and ending in 2024...to be informed by the reports of the technical expert dialogues**” and requests the COP Presidency to “prepare a summary of the deliberations at the high-level ministerial dialogue”.

Decides to **continue “deliberations on setting a new collective quantified goal” 2022-2024** and to take stock of the progress made and provide further guidance on the ad hoc work programme. **In 2024 the deliberations will conclude with a new collective quantified goal.** Developing countries had draft language asking for \$1.3 trillion/year by 2030 but there was **no agreement on reflecting any number.**

Requests the **Standing Committee on Finance** “to continue its work on definitions of climate finance, taking into account the submissions received from Parties”. Consultations on the review of the functions of the SCF did not yield any conclusions and will be taken up at COP27

Key divergences on **Article 9.5** of the PA (ex-ante biennial communication of information related to finance provided by developed countries) included language around highlighting concerns around missing elements from the first biennial communications, and calling on developed countries to improve information provided. The decision adopted on the matter “**recognizes with concern**” that not all developed country Parties have provided biennial communications in accordance with **Article 9(5)** of the PA and **urges developed countries to submit biennial communications before 31 December 2022.**

Invites developed countries “to **take into account the following areas for improvement**”: The indicative projections of climate finance for developing countries and specific plans for scaling up the provision and mobilization of climate finance; The information provided on projected levels of climate finance and lack of detail on themes, various channels and instruments across the biennial communications; The information on the shares of projected climate finance for adaptation and mitigation, and on plans for addressing the balance between the two”.

## Article 6

### Article 6.2

**Agrees what ITMOs are:** 1) Real, verified, and additional; 2) Emission reductions and removals, including mitigation co-benefits resulting from adaptation actions and/or economic diversification plans; 3) Measured in metric tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (in accordance with IPCC methodology) or in other non-greenhouse gas (GHG) metrics determined by the participating Parties that are consistent with the NDCs of the participating Parties; 4) Generated in respect of or representing mitigation from 2021 onward; 5) Mitigation outcomes authorized by a participating Party for use for international mitigation purposes other than achievement of an NDC; 6) emission reductions issued under 6.4 mechanism, when they are authorized for use towards achievement of NDCs and/or authorized for use for other international mitigation purposes.

**Requires that for all ITMOs each participating Party shall apply corresponding adjustments.**

**Sets no limits to how many ITMOs a Party can use to achieve its NDC,** but “Each participating Party shall ensure that the use of cooperative approaches does not lead to a net increase in emissions of participating Parties.”

**Requests the SBSTA to develop recommendations** for adoption at CMA4 for the “elaboration of further guidance in relation to corresponding adjustments for multi-year and single-year NDCs, in a manner that ensures the avoidance of double counting.”

Decides that in 2028, a review will consider whether to apply additional safeguards or limits on the use of credits under Article 6.2.

**Decides that share of proceeds is voluntary only with Parties only “strongly encouraged”** to contribute money for adaptation and to cancel some offsets to deliver “overall mitigation” when trading under Article 6.2.

### Article 6.4

**Establishes a “Supervisory Body” for the mechanism,** and invites the nomination of members and alternate members. The Body will meet twice in 2022 to: “develop provisions for the development and approval of methodologies, validation, registration, monitoring, verification and certification, issuance, renewal, first transfer from the mechanism registry, voluntary cancellation and other processes” and generally see what methodologies and rules around baselines, monitoring, safeguards, accreditation etc can be lifted from the CDM or other market mechanisms and applied in the 6.4 mechanism “with revisions”. The body is also requested to begin accrediting entities.

Rules state that **activity under 6.4 “shall be designed to achieve mitigation of GHG emissions that is additional”;** does “not lead to an increase in global emissions”; “deliver real, measurable

and long-term benefits related to climate change”; “minimize the risk” of non-permanence, leakage and negative social/environmental impacts.

Decides that an “Article 6.4 emission reduction” (A6.4ER) is issued for mitigation achieved pursuant to Article 6, paragraphs 4–6, and is to be measured in carbon dioxide equivalent and will be equal to 1 tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent.

Agrees that a **mandatory 5%** of traded offsets will be cancelled, with the share of proceeds **going towards the Adaptation Fund**, while **another 2% will be cancelled to deliver “overall mitigation”**. Developing countries had been pushing for much higher rates of cancellation and for these rates to be mandatory and equalised between the two schemes under Articles 6.2 and 6.4, but had to give way in the face of implacable opposition from the US and EU.

**Agrees to the “carryover” of carbon credits (CERs) generated under the CDM since 2013**, bringing up to 320m tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent into the PA 6.4 mechanism. More than 4bn credits might have been carried over if the transition had been unrestricted. “The CERs may be used towards achievement of the first NDC only and the CDM host Party shall not be required to apply a corresponding adjustment ... and not be subject to the share of proceeds...” **Allows projects registered under the CDM to become part of the Article 6.4 mechanism**, subject to meeting its new methodologies by 2025.

**Excludes the use of credits generated historically from “avoided deforestation” under REDD+.**

Signaled that disputes around carbon-offsetting projects will be subject to an independent grievance process, meeting a key ask from Indigenous and environmental groups.

## **Article 6.8**

Establishes a **work programme under the framework on non-market approaches (NMA)** and decides that “Each NMA facilitated under the framework aims to promote mitigation and adaptation ambition; enhance participation of public and private sector and CSOs in the implementation of NDCs; and enable opportunities for coordination across instruments and relevant institutional arrangements. Each NMA should also assist participating Parties in implementing their NDCs in an integrated, holistic and balanced manner. Each NMA under the framework must: be identified by the participating Parties on a voluntary basis; Involve more than one Party; Not involve the transfer of any mitigation outcomes; Facilitate the implementation of NDCs of host Parties; Be conducted in a manner that respects, promotes and considers respective obligations of Parties on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality etc; and must minimize and, where possible, avoid negative environmental, economic and social impacts.

Establishes a **Glasgow Committee on Non-Market Approaches** to take forward the development of climate cooperation under Article 6.8, with the committee due to meet twice a year until at least 2027.

## **Common Time Frames**

Reaffirms the nationally determined nature of NDCs but then “**encourages Parties to communicate in 2025 a NDC with an end date of 2035, in 2030 a NDCs with an end date of 2040, and so forth every five years there-after**”.

## **Transparency**

Previously COP24 had agreed that reporting under the PA would begin by 2024 but COP26 had to agree how that information would be reported (rows, columns, formats etc.) **The reporting should be common but allows for flexibility for developing countries** with capacity issues in terms of "collapsing" and "expanding" rows, columns, and tables (rather than deleting rows etc.)

**Requests Secretariat to prepare a reporting tool/software** with test version by June 2023, final version by June 2024, and to "facilitate interoperability" with IPCC GHG inventory software.

Also **requests Secretariat to create an "interactive web portal" with info on finance, tech., and capacity support**. Developed countries have to report on support provided and mobilized while developing countries report on support received and needed. Loss and damage info can be voluntarily included but is not subject to technical expert review.